Is the Carry Trade strategy an explanation of the Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle? by Albertsson, Benjamin
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the Carry Trade strategy an explanation of the  
Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle? 
 
 
 
Benjamin Albertsson 
 
Supervisor: Thomas Fischer 
 
Institution for Economics 
 
Lund University 
 
January 2018 
 
  
 Abstract 
This paper examines the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and extends the analysis in Spronk, 
Verschoor and Zwinkels (2013) by looking at the UIP between Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The flaws of the UIP and the reasons for why it does not seem to hold, has been 
called the UIP puzzle. The thesis tests if the UIP puzzle can be explained by constructing a 
heterogeneous agent model with a carry trader and a fundamental trader, trading with the 
expectation that the UIP holds. The results of the paper show that the UIP puzzle can partially 
be explained by the existence of carry traders in the market. A positive interest rate differential 
will impact the currency of the high-interest rate country to appreciate, a movement which is 
contradictory to what the UIP predicts. For future studies within the topic, researchers should 
carefully consider what agents that have the biggest impact in exchange rate markets and 
thereby possibly be included in the model. 
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1. Introduction 
Could it be the case that one of the most prominent theories for explaining exchange rate 
movements predicts future movements in the wrong direction? For a long time, the Uncovered 
Interest Parity (UIP) has been under debate. If studying economics at university, it is 
compulsory for every student to know what the parity means and what it predicts. However, 
following from recent studies on the parity, it seems like the UIP predicts future movements in 
the exchange rate in the wrong direction. 
 
The UIP states that between two countries, the currency of the country with the highest interest 
rate should depreciate to the currency of the country with the lower interest rate. However, 
recent studies present results that contradicts the theory, saying that, on average, it seems like 
the currency of the country with the highest interest rate actually appreciates. The discussion 
has become known as the “UIP puzzle”, where researchers are trying to explain why the UIP 
seems to predict future exchange rate movements in the wrong direction. 
 
Many explanations have been given to explain the flaws of UIP. Some argue that the 
assumptions of the theory are faulty, whereas others argue that the problem lies in psychological 
effects meaning that investors require risk premiums for certain investments, while others 
blame “noise traders” to be too dominant in the market and therefore disrupt rational 
expectations. One of the explanations is given by Spronk, Verschoor and Zwinkels (2013). 
Through the creation of a heterogeneous agent model, the authors examine whether carry 
trading could explain the flaws of the UIP. A carry trader is an investor who borrows money in 
the low-interest country, converts the money into the foreign currency, puts the money in a 
government bond and finally converts the money back to the domestic currency. With other 
words, the carry trader expects the exchange rate to move in opposite direction to what the UIP 
predicts. 
 
This thesis will test the UIP by looking at the impact of carry traders in the exchange rate market 
by constructing a heterogeneous agent model in a similar approach as in Spronk et al. (2013). 
However, in this paper, two modifications will be made. As the paper by Spronk et al. (2013) 
simulates interest rates, this thesis will use interest rates for Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, the model will only consist of a carry trader and a fundamental trader, excluding 
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the chartist trader. The fundamental trader trades with the expectations that the UIP condition 
holds, and the carry trader with the expectation that the exchange rate will move in the opposite 
direction to what the UIP predicts. Therefore, the thesis aims to compare a simulated exchange 
rate generated by the model to the results in Spronk et al. (2013), in order to see if the activity 
of carry traders changes, and if so, how it affects the explanation of carry traders on the UIP 
puzzle. Additionally, the paper will analyse the differences in results if a model simulates 
interest rates rather than using interest rates seen in the market. 
 
The results continue to show that the carry trader will impact the domestic country to appreciate 
in times of a positive interest rate differential. Moreover, the beta value for the interest rate 
differential is measured at -1.23 and is statistically different from zero, meaning that a positive 
interest rate differential between the two countries will, on average, force the currency of the 
high-interest country to appreciate. For future studies, one should look at the importance of 
different traders in the exchange rate market, and if any of the traders cannot be excluded in a 
similar model setup. 
 
The thesis will have the following disposition: in the next section, Section 2, a review of the 
literature will be given. In Section 3, the theoretical framework is presented. Empirical findings 
are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the model for generating a simulated exchange rate is 
explained. In Section 6, the properties of the model are presented. In Section 7, results are 
analysed and compared to empirical findings. Finally, Section 8 concludes the thesis. 
2. Literature Review 
To predict future exchange rate movements, is a continuous question for economists, investors 
and state-level decision makers.  Between World War II and the break-down of the former 
Soviet Union, several economies and states have undergone a process of deregulation in 
exchange rate regimes. New and open markets have resulted in a rapid increase in the volumes 
trading in the exchange rate market. As more financial products were invented, for example the 
fixed income securities and options industry during the 1980s, exchange rates today depend on 
several different economic fundamentals and new theories can emerge together with new 
financial products, for the sake of predictability and to foresee movements in exchange rates. 
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Several theories have tried to explain movements in the exchange rate market, in the long term 
perspective as well as in the short term perspective. One of the parities that aims to explain 
foreign exchange movements, is the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP). The UIP states that the 
expected movement in an exchange rate is given by the difference in interest rates in the 
previous period between two countries (Chinn and Meredith, 2004). The relationship has been 
debated in a great amount of papers from the 1980s and onwards. One of the most impactful 
papers was written by Eugene Fama (1984), where he examined the role of forward rates and 
how the forward market affects and impacts future movements in the exchange rate. Fama 
(1984) states that the role of forward rates to predict future spot rate movements is weak. It 
might even be that the forward rate may predict the future spot market change in the wrong 
direction (Sarno, 2005). The finding has placed Covered Interest Parity (CIP) and the already 
mentioned UIP under scrutiny. CIP is an arbitrage relationship which states that the spot price 
and the future’s price are related to the changes in the interest rate differential. If CIP holds, 
consequently, the forward rate must be an unbiased predictor of future exchange rate changes 
(Sarno, 2005). However, according to Fama (1984), the forward rate seems to be a biased 
predictor of future spot rate movements. Therefore, the UIP cannot hold as the expected 
exchange rate change cannot be explained by only looking at the interest rate differential 
(Chinn, 2007). The anomaly has been given several names such as the forward premium puzzle, 
the UIP puzzle and the forward bias puzzle (Miller, 2014, ch.1, p.7). Henceforth, the term UIP 
puzzle will be used. 
 
Throughout the years, several explanations have been presented in order to answer the question 
of the UIP puzzle and why it exists. The underlying problem is to evaluate whether the interest 
rate differential in one period can explain the exchange rate change in the next period. An 
ordinary least squares regression (OLS), formulated in Chinn (2007), has the following setup: 𝑠"#$ − 𝑠" = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙") + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟	𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚. 
 
According to the UIP, the beta coefficient (𝛽) for the interest rate differential at time t should 
be equal to one. Meaning that the movements in interest rates between two countries is the one 
aspect affecting the exchange rate in the next period, t+k. However, in a meta study by Froot 
and Thaler (1990), the average beta value appears to be closer to negative unity than to unity, -
0.88 to be precise. The result is extraordinary and implies that the currency of the country with 
the highest interest rate will appreciate, thus generating a profit in both the interest rate 
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differential and in an appreciation of the currency for an investor trading against the UIP 
(Miller, 2014, ch.1, p.7). 
 
There exist several competing theories to explain why the beta value is different from unity. 
Fama’s (1984) explanation is that a forward rate is given by the expected future movement plus 
a forward premium, a premium dependent on time variations. Sarno (2005) goes on to say that 
if investors are risk-averse, then they must require a risk premium, which distorts the UIP 
assumptions. If investors demand a risk premium, and the risk premium is not a variable in the 
OLS regression, a problem will occur with serial autocorrelations. The OLS regression will 
therefore generate inconsistent and biased estimates of beta (Sarno, 2005). Some studies claim 
that the puzzle only can be seen in different economic conditions and in developed countries 
(Miller, 2014, ch.1). Chinn and Meredith (2004) argue that earlier studies on the UIP relation 
are problematic because of the use of short term data. When using long-term data, interest rates 
with maturities of five to ten years, the beta value is never negative and almost equal to one. 
Chinn (2007) summarizes the three most prominent theories of the existence of the UIP puzzle: 
Investors are not rational as assumed by theory, there is a problem with implementing the 
econometric regression, and the existence of a risk premium. McCallum (1994), on the other 
hand, argues that the UIP puzzle exists because of monetary policy makers. Policy makers tend 
to resist fast changes in the exchange rate. If the exchange rate rises, the policy makers will 
resist the change by implementing an expansionary policy. 
 
The presentation of different explanations can continue. However, in the exchange rate market, 
a strategy called carry trade has emerged from the UIP puzzle (Galati and Melvin, 2004). If the 
future exchange rate does not negatively compensate an investor for borrowing in a low-interest 
country and invest the borrowed capital in a high-interest country, the UIP cannot hold and the 
investor will make a profit. The strategy has been used to analyse the movements in the foreign 
exchange market, thus providing an answer to the UIP puzzle (Spronk, Verschoor and 
Zwinkels, 2013). An exchange rate market consists of several investors with different 
expectations of future exchange rates. According to Pojarliev and Levich (2008), there are four 
important ways in how to trade in the exchange rate market. Trades and expectations can be 
based on value, which means that the investor believes an exchange rate is connected to a 
specific value given by a theory, such as the UIP or the Purchase Power Parity. Another style 
is the trend trader, a strategy based on the assumption that the momentum change will continue. 
Such an investor is called a chartist trader. The third investment style is called volatility trade, 
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which means that an investor expects an exchange rate to move according to a specific 
volatility. Consequently, the last investment style is the already mentioned carry trade. Pojarliev 
and Levich (2010) further argues that the four types of investors, together, can explain the 
activity in the exchange rate market to a large extent. 
 
According to Frankel and Froot (1990), a heterogeneous agent model (HAM) is particularly 
efficient in describing exchange rate movements and capture how different agents trade in the 
market, due to the fact that investors have heterogeneous expectations of future exchange rate 
movements. A remarkable increase in the volumes trading indicates such expectations exists in 
the market (Frankel and Froot, 1990). The overall question is how the agents’ expectations of 
future exchange rates impacts the future exchange rate. This question can be evaluated by using 
a HAM. As the HAM can separate the different agents and evaluate them one at a time, a HAM 
is especially efficient in analysing which agent dominates the market, hence which expectation 
of the future it is that dominates the market. Furthermore, by adding agents to a model, the 
model will be able to generate different characteristics and stylized facts seen in exchange rates 
(Pojarliev and Levich, 2008). 
 
The HAM in Spronk et al. (2013) differs from other models such as the one in Brock and 
Hommes (1997) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) as the model includes a carry trader 
together with a chartist trader and a fundamental (value) trader. By adding the carry trader, 
characteristics are now able to be generated differently from only including the chartist and the 
fundamental investor. However, in this paper, the chartist investor will be excluded. The chartist 
investor has a tendency to dominate the market, therefore extrapolating the changes seen in the 
exchange rate market, thus the effect of fundamentalists trading according to the UIP and the 
carry trader impact will diminish (Spronk et al., 2013). The question is therefore: by excluding 
the chartist investor, in what way will the results change? 
 
However, studies including a fundamental trader and a carry trader only, is not common. The 
chartist trader and the carry trader trades typically on the same side of the market. However, 
the carry trader and the fundamental trader takes, always, opposite sides of the expected 
changes (Spronk et al., 2013). The effects of these two different expectations will be the results 
of this paper. By including a chartist trader, the results of how carry traders and fundamental 
traders impact the market will be smaller. Therefore, the thesis will exclude the chartist trader. 
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The model in this paper will be a replication of the one proposed in Spronk et al. (2013) with 
the difference that the chartist trader is excluded and that the interest rates used are based on 
exchange rate data and not simulated data. The results of the paper will involve a comparison 
to the accomplishments that can be made by two agents rather than three. The model will serve 
as a benchmark to empirical results seen in the exchange rate markets. Therefore, the purpose 
of the paper is to analyse if the UIP relationship holds. Furthermore, by looking at the carry 
trade strategy, discuss whether the UIP puzzle can be explained by including a carry trader but 
not the chartist trader to a heterogeneous agent model. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
There is a wide range of explanations for the parameters that causes exchange rates to move, in 
the long run as well as in the short run. In the long run, there is empirical evidence that the 
exchange rate between two countries follows the relative inflation rate between the countries. 
The implication of this relationship is that if a country has a higher rate of inflation than another 
country, the currency of the country with the high inflation rate will depreciate with a rate given 
by the inflation rate differential. The theory is called the relative purchasing power parity 
(Burda and Wyplosz, 2013, p.149). In the short run, the two most common theories to explain 
the movements in an exchange rate is the Covered Interest Parity (CIP) and the Uncovered 
Interest Parity (UIP) (Cuthbertson, 1996, p.260). However, before describing the parities, there 
is a need to outline how exchange rates can be acquired. 
 
The foreign exchange market consists of two types of deals. An investor can either purchase an 
exchange rate on the spot market, meaning that the exchange rate is to be delivered immediately 
and the price is quoted accordingly. The other option is to purchase the exchange rate on the 
futures market, i.e. the exchange rate is to be delivered in the future for a price agreed on today 
(Burda and Wyplosz, 2013, p.375). For future contracts, the most common maturities are set 
between one and six months (Cuthbertson, 1996, p.259). There is a linkage between the price 
of an exchange rate on the spot market and in the futures market. The relationship can be shown 
by looking at two investments in two different countries, involving two government bonds and 
the relative exchange rate changes between the countries. Based on the assumptions of no 
default risk, full capital mobility and efficient markets, i.e. arbitrage opportunities do not exist 
continuously, for an investor to be indifferent between buying a bond in the home country or in 
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the foreign country, the investment must generate the same return. The return on the investment 
will lead to the following relationship between the spot price and the futures price: 𝐹"𝑆" = 1 + 𝑟"<1 + 𝑟"=		, 
where 𝐹"	denotes the futures price and 𝑆" the spot price denominated in the amount of domestic 
units in terms of foreign currency units, 𝑟"< the domestic interest rate on the government bond 
and 𝑟"= the interest rate of the foreign government bond with the same maturity. The relationship 
between the two prices will be given by the ratio between the domestic interest rate and the 
foreign interest rate (Cuthbertson, 1996 p.260). 
 
If the investor invests the money in the foreign government bond, the investor will be facing an 
exchange rate risk when converting the investment back to the domestic currency. The 
implication of the relationship above is that by using a futures contract, the investment is 
riskless. It is riskless because the investor will know beforehand what the conversion rate will 
be between the two currencies when converting back the money. The relationship is called the 
covered interest parity. As the investor buys the futures contract, the investment is covered in 
the sense that the exchange rate risk is eliminated. The relationship can be re-formulated: 1 + 𝑟"< = 1 + 𝑟"= 𝐹"𝑆"		, 
which means that an investment in the domestic country, will be equal to an investment in a 
foreign denominated bond when the price rate is considered. The equation can be approximated 
to measure percentage term interest rates: 𝑟"< = 𝑟"= − 𝐹" − 𝑆"𝑆" 		, 
where the latter term is referred to as the forward premium. The implication of a positive 
forward premium is that the futures price of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign 
currency is higher than the spot value. In the case of a stronger domestic currency in the future 
market than in the spot market, the theory suggests a lower 𝑟"< than 𝑟"= leading to equal returns 
on the investments (Burda and Wyplosz, 2013, p.376). 
 
As explained earlier, the covered interest rate parity results in a riskless investment. However, 
investing in a futures contract is not an obligation for the investor. If the investor wants to have 
an exposure to foreign exchange changes, then the strategy would be to buy the foreign currency 
in the spot market, buy a foreign denominated bond, wait for the bond to mature and then with 
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the return on the foreign bond, buy back the domestic currency. The new condition is based on 
the assumption that investors are risk-neutral, meaning that they do not require a risk premium 
on their investments to be indifferent between a riskless and a risky investment. As explained, 
the strategy involves buying the foreign currency in the spot market to a value of 𝑆", and buy 
back the domestic currency to a value of 𝑆"#?. For the no-arbitrage condition to hold, the 
investment return must be given by the following relationship: 1 + 𝑟"< = 1 + 𝑟"= 𝑆"𝑆"#?@ 	, 
for which 𝑆"#?@  is the expected exchange rate at the end of the investment period. The 
relationship is called the uncovered interest parity because of the uncovered position towards 
possible changes, positive or negative, in the exchange rate between the countries. The 
relationship can be approximated as: 𝑟"< ≈ 𝑟"= − 𝑆"#?@ − 𝑆"𝑆" 		, 
 
where the latter part of the equation presents the expected appreciation of the domestic currency 
in terms of the foreign currency (Burda and Wyplosz, 2013, p.376). 
 
For an investor to be indifferent between investing in a domestic or a foreign bond, the two 
investments must yield the same return. If, for example, the interest rate is lower in the domestic 
country than the foreign, the domestic exchange rate is expected to appreciate. If the condition 
does not hold, arbitrage opportunities would occur as an investor could buy either one of the 
bonds, and convert back to the domestic currency which would not move in the opposite 
direction of what the investor wants, which would yield a return greater than what could be 
expected from the interest rate differential (Burda and Wyplosz, 2013, p.376). 
 
The implications of the UIP is that the changes in the exchange rates will be explained by the 
interest rate differential between the two countries. For the UIP to hold, the market must be 
dominated by risk-neutral investors, founding their expectations on future changes in the UIP 
relation. In this paper, investors trading based on the UIP condition is called to have a 
fundamentalist approach. This is an important assumption in the UIP condition. It could 
therefore be stressed that risk-averse investors nor so-called “noise traders” have a significant 
impact on exchange rate prices (Cuthbertson, 1996, p.261). 
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To understand the findings in Fama (1984), the relationship between the CIP and the UIP is 
crucial. If the two parities hold simultaneously, then the forward rate will be an unbiased 
predictor of the future exchange rate change. This implies, 𝐹" = 𝑆"#?@ . 
This relationship holds under the assumption that investors are risk-neutral (Cuthbertson, 1996, 
p.264). However, if, as Fama states, the forward rate is a biased predictor of future changes in 
the exchange rate, then the UIP is biased in predicting future changes in the exchange rate. 
Consequently, the UIP puzzle is inevitable. 
3.1. Carry trade strategy 
However, the question concerns how reasonable the assumption is. Furthermore, what would 
be the consequences if “noise traders” or risk-averse investors have an impact on market prices? 
The assumption has been analysed in many papers. One of the papers is the study by Spronk et 
al. (2013). In the paper, the authors analyse if the carry trade strategy can be an answer to the 
UIP puzzle. 
 
The most common and simple form of carry trade strategy is to borrow in a low-interest country, 
convert the money into the foreign currency and invest the same amount in the high-interest 
country. The currency of the borrowing country is called “the funding currency”, and the 
currency of the high-interest rate currency is called “the target currency”. A carry trade strategy 
can also be constructed with buying an exchange rate on the futures market if it is lower than 
the spot market. The construction is similar to the former strategy (Cavallo, 2006). However, 
the thesis will continue with the more common construction. 
 
The carry trade strategy can be profitable for two reasons. The first one is given by the interest 
rate differential between the two interest rates. If the exchange rate stays on the same level 
during the investment period, then the profit will be given by the interest rate differential. The 
second one is if the currency of the high-interest rate country has appreciated during the 
investment period. The case of an unchanging exchange rate during the investment period, is a 
very unlikely scenario. As exchange rate changes, the carry trade strategy involves a risk. As 
explained in the theoretical section, an exchange rate acquired in the spot market will always 
involve the risk that, in the case of carry trade, the low-interest currency will appreciate. 
(Cavallo, 2006). Therefore, the carry trade strategy is only profitable if the UIP does not hold 
as carry traders trade in opposite direction of what the UIP predicts. 
 10 
 
As the high-interest country appears to appreciate on average (Frankel and Froot, 1990), it is 
reasonable to believe that investors consider the strategy as a good investment. In a study by 
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo (2006), who compared the returns from the 
carry trade strategy between 1977 and 2005, the authors present that the strategy gave a similar 
return to the S&P500 index during the same period. Furthermore, the authors state that the 
reason why the strategy is attractive, is not only due to the returns given, but also the relatively 
low volatility in the returns. The combination of satisfying returns to low volatility, is an 
important way to measure the attractiveness of the strategy for an investor. In this respect, the 
paper shows the reasons for why carry traders are common traders in the exchange rate market. 
However, Cavallo (2006) finds that the transaction costs, measured as bid-ask spreads, is 
considerably higher for carry trade strategies than for investing in the S&P500. The 
consequence of this is, indeed, a lower profit, forcing the investor to invest longer in the interest 
rate assets to compensate for a higher return. Time, however, induces more risk to the strategy. 
It is therefore important to, when analysing carry trade profits, have an adjustment for risk. 
 
The size of carry traders in the exchange rate market is debated. As the most common 
transaction involves currency swaps, which is not reported in balance sheets, it is difficult to 
clearly see the magnitude of the strategy (Cavallo, 2006). Nonetheless, Galati and Melvin 
(2004) argues that some movements during the early 2000s, are due to increased activity by 
carry traders, indicating that the strategy is an impactful parameter in the movements of 
exchange rates. However, the activity can be tracked as the Bank for International Settlements 
statistics can find footprints of traders in futures positions and transactions in the over-the-
counter market. It can be seen in the balance sheets of banks if borrowing or deposits in specific 
denominated currencies increase or decrease, which can provide useful support when analysing 
what currencies carry traders use as funding currencies and target currencies (Galati, Health, 
McGuire, 2007). 
 
Galati and Melvin (2004) find that some countries are more commonly used as funding 
currencies and other countries typically constitute the target currencies. By looking at ten-year 
government bonds, funding currencies (low-interest rate countries) are often Japan and 
Switzerland. The target currencies (high-interest rate countries) are typically represented by 
countries like the United Kingdom, New Zeeland and Australia. Galati and Melvin (2004) 
compare the interest rate differential between Australia and the United States in Libor (London 
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Interbank Offered Rate), which was as high as four percent in 2004. This indicates that 
substantial profits can be made through the strategy. 
 
In the exchange rate market, the most common type of investor is the so called institutional 
investor, consisting mainly of pension funds and insurance companies, followed by hedge funds 
and commodity traders. These agents are typically important players in the foreign exchange 
market. Over the period 2001-2004, it appears that hedge funds have had an increased impact 
on exchange rate movements (Galati and Melvin, 2004). Banks, on the other hand, are 
important players due to the role of being an intermediary, providing loans in the low-interest 
country and deposits in the high-interest country (Galati et al., 2007). 
4. Empirical findings 
To examine whether an exchange rate follows the UIP relation or not, a fundamental exchange 
rate will be simulated based on the UIP and compared to an exchange rate seen in the market. 
The exchange rate of Sweden (SEK) and the United Kingdom (GBP) will be used, denoting 
Sweden as the domestic country and the UK as the foreign country. Following from Spronk et 
al. (2013), the fundamental exchange rate, 𝑠"∗, is given by the UIP condition: 𝑠"#?∗ = 𝑠"∗ 1 + 𝑟"<1 + 𝑟"= + 𝜂"∗					(1) 
where 𝑠"#?∗  is the exchange rate in the next period, 𝑟"< is the domestic interest rate, 𝑟"= the foreign 
domestic interest rate, and 𝜂"∗ a noise term. The data used for the interest rates is taken from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream, using daily bid yields from a 1 month government bond in the 
two countries, between the years of November 1987 and November 2017. The data used for the 
exchange rate is daily rates presented by the Swedish Riksbank. The 30-year period consists of 
7,828 trading days. To add noise to the fundamental exchange rate, the stochastic term, 𝜂"∗, in 
the fundamental exchange rate is normally distributed and has a mean of zero and a variance of 
0.015. The presence of noise traders in financial markets is unquestionable (Black, 1986). 
However, it could be discussed how large the group is and the impact it has on the foreign 
exchange market. The variance and mean values are set to include noise traders but only to be 
a minority in the market. 
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Figure 1. The upper panel shows the fundamental exchange rate and the exchange rate between the Swedish krona and the 
British sterling. The lower panel shows the interest rates in the two countries and the interest rate differential. 
 
In Figure 1, the black line in the upper panel represents the empirical exchange rate in the 
market denominated in SEK/GBP, and the red line represents the fundamental exchange rate 
according to the UIP. The lower panel presents the interest rates in percentage terms and the 
interest rate differential between the two countries (orange line, Swedish interest rate minus the 
UK interest rate). If the UIP would hold, the exchange rate seen in the market would be solely 
influenced by the movements in the relative interest rate between the two countries and the 
black line would be equal to the red line. However, this is rarely the case. The only periods 
when the UIP line corresponds with the empirical data, more or less, is from 1987 to 1989, a 
shorter period in 1992, around 1996, a shorter time in 2011 and 2012 and then finally at the end 
in 2017. It appears that the empirical exchange rate mostly is above the fundamental exchange 
rate, meaning that the Swedish krona is weaker than what appears to be the case if the UIP 
would determine the exchange rate. Thus, there is a need to question the UIP relationship as it 
seems like the UIP does not hold between Sweden and the United Kingdom during this period. 
This implies that there are more investors than the UIP-rational investor active in the market, 
alternatively that any of the UIP conditions are not met. To analyse the different investment 
styles and their impact in the exchange rate market, a heterogeneous agent model will be 
constructed. 
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5. Methodology 
To assess the Uncovered Interest Parity, a heterogeneous agent model (HAM) is created to 
analyse the movements in the exchange rate. A HAM setup is an appropriate method for 
analysing how different agents’ expectations, all existing in the market, impact the exchange 
rate (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). The model which will be used is similar to a model 
proposed by Spronk et al. (2013). According to the paper by Spronk et al. (2013), the UIP 
puzzle can be analysed through a model containing different agents, trading in relation to 
different movements in the exchange rate. A HAM is particularly accurate in replicating 
stylized facts seen in exchange rate markets such as excess kurtosis, excess volatility and 
volatility clustering. For the model to be statistically relevant, it is important that the model can 
replicate the stylized facts (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). It is then possible to disconnect 
the UIP puzzle and provide an answer to the movements in the exchange rate. 
5.1. The exchange rate market 
In this essay, the exchange rate market is represented by two countries: Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The Swedish krona and the British sterling are common trading currencies in the 
exchange rate market (BIS, 2016). Following from section 3.1, the UK is often involved in 
carry trade setups. However, the Swedish krona is rarely mentioned as a common currency in 
carry trading. Therefore, the thesis aims to extend the previous carry trade theory by including 
the Swedish krona, to see if theoretical explanations also hold for currencies that are rarely 
involved in carry trading activities. Moreover, investments will be viewed from a Swedish-
investor perspective. Therefore, as in the previous section, Sweden will be denoted as the 
domestic country and the UK as the foreign country. 
5.2. Model 
The agents in the model will be represented by fundamental traders and carry traders. The 
fundamental trader is trading according to the UIP theory, meaning that the fundamental trader 
expects the exchange rate to move towards the exchange rate given by the UIP relation. The 
carry trader will trade against the UIP, expecting the exchange rate of the high-interest rate 
country to appreciate, rather than depreciate as predicted by the UIP. In relation to other studies 
using a HAM, this setup emphasises the effects of the carry trader on the exchange rate 
compared to models like in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) where the carry trader is left out. 
The difference in this setup compared to the one proposed in Spronk et al. (2013) is that the 
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chartist trader is excluded. The chartist trader is a momentum trader, meaning that the trader 
expects the most recent trend to persist. Therefore, a movement upwards or downwards will be 
extrapolated by the chartist trader. This delimitation of excluding the chartist trader, will impact 
the results compared to the ones seen in Spronk et al. (2013). It will be negative in the sense 
that the chartist expectation constitutes an important part of the expectations in the market 
(Frankel and Froot, 1990). However, as the chartist trader tends to dominate the market more 
than the two other traders, the impact of carry trading and fundamental trading in the market 
will be more observable by excluding the chartist trader. 
 
The fundamental exchange rate 
The fundamental exchange rate is expected to move according to the UIP relation, as in Frankel 
and Froot (1990) and Spronk et al. (2013). Spronk et al. (2013) states that the most prominent 
models used to simulate a fundamental value in a HAM setup is the UIP and Purchase Power 
Parity, indicating the relevance of using the UIP as the underlying model of the fundamental 
exchange rate. 
 
Following from the UIP relation, the fundamental exchange rate, 𝑠"∗, is given by equation (1) 
where 𝑠"#?∗  is the fundamental exchange rate in the next period, 𝑟"< is the domestic interest rate, 𝑟"= the foreign domestic interest rate, and 𝜂"∗ a small noise term. Accordingly, the fundamental 
exchange rate will be determined by the relative changes between the two interest rates. The 
data used to simulate the fundamental exchange rate will be the same as in section 4. The 30-
year period consists of 7,828 trading days. Therefore, the model will be simulated over 7,828 
periods. This setup is somewhat shorter than the model in Spronk et al. (2013) using 10,000 
simulated periods. 
Rules for forecasting the exchange rate 
As described earlier, the agents will form their expectations differently. The fundamental trader 
expects the exchange rate to move towards the fundamental value. The expected exchange rate 
changes according to the fundamentalist trader, 𝐸F," ∆𝑠"#? , is given by: 𝐸F," ∆𝑠"#? = 𝛼 𝑠"∗ − 𝑠" 					(2) 
where 𝑠" is the current simulated exchange rate and 𝛼 is a positive parameter which denotes the 
speed of which the trader expects the exchange rate to move towards the fundamental exchange 
rate. For the fundamental trader to have the correct expectations, the parameter 𝛼 must take a 
value in the interval of 0 < 𝛼 £ 1. 
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The carry trader’s expectations will be the opposite of the fundamentalist trader. The interest 
rate differential is the key component, which makes the expected exchange rate change for the 
carry trader, 𝐸JK," ∆𝑠"#? , to look like: 𝐸JK," ∆𝑠"#? = −𝛾 𝑟"< − 𝑟"= 					(3) 
where 𝛾 represents the preferences of the carry trader of how much the interest rate differential 
will affect the exchange rate. Consequently, for the carry trader to have the correct expectations, 
the parameter 𝛾 must be bigger than zero.  Equation 3 is in line with the theory of the carry 
trader, saying that if the interest rate differential is positive, then the trader can make a profit 
by borrowing in the low-interest country, convert the money to the high-interest country 
currency and invest the money. The outcome will involve a higher demand for the high-interest 
rate country, hence an appreciation of the currency of the high-interest rate country. This 
movement is captured by the minus sign in the first part of the equation. 
 
To summarise the two investment strategies in the model, it is clear that the carry trader and the 
fundamental trader will trade in opposite directions depending on the interest rate differential. 
If, for example, the domestic country has a higher interest rate than the foreign country, the 
exchange rate is expected to depreciate according to the fundamental trader and appreciate 
according to the carry trader. They have complete opposite expectations of future exchange rate 
movements. 
Weights of profits and changing between strategies 
In the model, agents can switch between the different strategies. The switching between 
strategies will be determined by the profits that the strategy has made in the previous period. 
The profits of the specific strategy will be given by: 𝜋O," = 𝑠" 1 + 𝑟"= − 𝑠"P? 1 + 𝑟"< 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 1 + 𝑟"= 𝐸O,"P? 𝑠" − 1 + 𝑟"< 𝑠"P? 					(4) 
where i = F (fundamentalist) and CT (carry trader). Thus, the profit will be given by investing 
one unit of the foreign currency. The sign is determined by whether the agent expected the 
movement in the exchange rate correctly: 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑥 = 1	𝑖𝑓	𝑥 > 00	𝑖𝑓	𝑥 = 0−1	𝑖𝑓	𝑥 < 0 
To get profits adjusted for risk, the following modification will be made: 𝜋O,"W = 𝜋O,O − 𝜇𝜎O,"Z 					(5) 
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where 𝜎O,"Z  is the amount of risk measured by the difference in expected exchange rate to the 
outcome and 𝜇 a parameter representing the level of risk aversion. By using risk-adjusted 
profits, the model can capture the risk that the investor may forecast the exchange rate 
incorrectly. The risk 𝜎O,"Z  is given by: 𝜎O,"Z = (𝐸O,"P? 𝑠" − 𝑠")Z					(6). 
 
In order to determine the market expectations based on past performance, a switching rule must 
be formulated. The weights of the two strategies in the market will be determined by the profit 𝜋OW. Consequently, for an agent to choose between the strategies based on the performance in 
the previous period, the weights will be calculated as: 𝑤F,JK = exp	(𝜑𝜋OW)exp 𝜑𝜋FW + exp	(𝜑𝜋JKW )						(7) 
where 𝜑 is a parameter bigger than zero, representing how fast an agent is prepared to switch 
between two strategies. Consequently, a value of 𝜑=0 would mean that investors are not willing 
to change strategy regardless of past profit performances, whereas 𝜑 → ∞ implies that investors 
are willing to switch strategies completely even if the difference in profit generated between 
the strategies is extremely small. In this case, investors of the market would use the superior 
strategy at all times. The outcome of this step will show which strategy that will dominate the 
market. 
The final step 
The final step before the model is ready to be used is to summarize the weights and the expected 
change for the different strategies. The expected change, 𝐸"∆𝑠"#?, is given by: 𝐸"∆𝑠"#? = (𝑤O,"𝐸O,"(∆𝑠"#?))OeF,JK 						(8) 
where 𝑤O," represents the weights of the two strategies in the market at time t. The exchange 
rate will thus depend on the weighted expectation of an agent, representing how the market 
expects the exchange rate to move. It is assumed that the expected change equals the realized 
change. For the exchange rate to include noise traders in the market, a normally distributed 
noise term is added which gives the last equation of the simulated exchange rate change, ∆𝑠"#?: ∆𝑠"#? = 𝐸"∆𝑠"#? + 𝜂"						(9). 
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5.3. Choosing parameters 
The exchange rate generated by the model is highly dependent on the parameters described in 
the previous section. The choice of the used parameters is based on the approach by Spronk et 
al. (2013). However, a final re-calibration was necessary due to the differences in the model, in 
order to replicate the effects and patterns observed in the exchange rate market and also to avoid 
negative exchange rates. 
 
Table 1. The selection of parameters in the model. 
Parameter Value Explanation 
a 0.2 Speed of movement 
g 0.7 Carry trader preference 
j 10 Switch velocity 
µ 1 Risk aversion 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Properties of the model 
The model is simulated over 7,828 periods, from November 1987 to November 2017, where 
one period is set to one day. The stochastic term, 𝜂"∗, in the fundamental exchange rate is 
normally distributed and has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 0.13. The stochastic 
term, 𝜂", in the final step of the model, is expected to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 0.17. The simulated exchange rate, the exchange rate based on the UIP condition 
and the exchange rate between the Swedish krona and the UK pound, is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The upper panel displays the simulated exchange rate, the fundamental exchange rate and the exchange rate given 
by data. The middle panel shows the weights of investors who are active in the market, where the blue line shows the 
fundamental investors. Finally, the bottom panel displays the interest rates and the interest rate differential. 
 
The simulated exchange rate generated by the model, the blue line in the upper panel, shows 
features that appear in the exchange rate market. The simulated exchange rate follows the 
fundamental exchange rate to a large extent. However, sudden drops in the simulated exchange 
rate can be seen four times in the figure. These sudden drops are commonly known as bubble 
phases. Bubble phases are a recurring theme in exchange rate markets (Spronk et al., 2013). 
The bubble phases that can be seen takes places in the first year of the investment period, from 
1992 to 1995, in 2011 and finally in 2013. There are two mutual denominators during the bubble 
phases. First of all, which can be seen in the bottom panel, is that the interest rate differential is 
positive when these phases occur. A positive interest rate differential implicates that the carry 
trade strategy becomes profitable and the weights of the carry traders will become active, which 
leads on to the second denominator. The second denominator is the fact that during the bubble 
phases, carry traders fully dominate the market, which can be seen in the middle panel. 
 
Along with bubble phases, it appears that the simulated exchange rate tends to move towards 
and in collaboration with the fundamental exchange rate. The tendency is displayed during the 
times of a negative or a low interest rate differential, such as the longer period from 1996 to 
2011. During these phases, the middle panel shows that the fundamental trader is more active 
in the market. It is during these periods that the fundamental trader is able to predict the 
1987-11 1990-11 1993-11 1996-11 1999-11 2002-11 2005-11 2008-11 2011-11 2014-11 2017-11
0
5
10
15
SE
K/
G
BP
Exchange rates Fundamental exchange rateSimulated exchange rate
SEK/GBP
1987-11 1990-11 1993-11 1996-11 1999-11 2002-11 2005-11 2008-11 2011-11 2014-11 2017-11
0
0.5
1
Weights
Carry Traders
1987-11 1990-11 1993-11 1996-11 1999-11 2002-11 2005-11 2008-11 2011-11 2014-11 2017-11
0
2
4
6
%
10-4 Interest rates
Swe interest rate
UK interest rate
Interest rate differential
 19 
exchange rate movement in the next period correctly. When the trader correctly predicts the 
future movement, the trader is on the right side of the market, thus generating a higher profit 
and therefore a higher weight of fundamental traders in the market. At the same time, the 
interest rate differential is too low for the carry trade strategy to be profitable, as these traders 
will switch to the fundamental strategy. 
6.2. The effect of interest rates 
Intuitively, interest rates impact the simulated exchange rate in two ways. As the fundamental 
exchange rate is, except of a small noise term, dependent on the differences in the relative 
interest rates between the countries, the fundamental exchange rate will move in relation to 
interest rate movements. From equation 1, it is understood that as the domestic interest rate 
increases in relation to the foreign, the fundamental exchange rate will increase i.e. the Swedish 
krona will depreciate to the UK pound. This is, as stated in the theoretical section, predicted by 
theory. In the simulation, it can be seen that when the interest rate differential increases, the 
fundamental exchange rate slightly increases, i.e. the Swedish krona depreciates to the UK 
pound. This is displayed from 1992 to 1996; the fundamental exchange rate slowly increases 
during this phase. The opposite relationship occurs when the interest rate differential decreases 
which makes the fundamental exchange rate to decrease i.e. the Swedish krona appreciates to 
the UK pound. This can be seen in the period from 1996 to 2008. 
 
The second way in which interest rates impact the exchange rate, is through the profitability of 
the carry trader strategy. The condition for the carry trade strategy to be profitable, is a positive 
interest rate differential. As explained earlier, this is displayed in the simulation in the first part 
around 1988, a longer period from 1992 to 1995, in 2011 and finally in 2013. A positive interest 
rate differential makes the carry trade strategy profitable and the strategy will therefore 
dominate the market. 
6.3. The carry trade impact 
An important observation in the simulation, is to see the effects of an exchange rate market 
dominated by carry traders. In the simulation, the middle panel demonstrates that carry traders 
dominate the market in parts of 1988 (1), the interval between 1992 and 1995 (2), in 2011 (3) 
and finally in 2013 (4). During these intervals, the investors influence the exchange rate to 
decrease (appreciation of the Swedish krona). The results are contradictory to the UIP theory. 
When the interest rate in Sweden is greater than in the UK, the Swedish krona is expected to 
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depreciate to compensate for a higher interest rate. This is due to the profitability of the carry 
trade strategy, which increases when the interest rate differential increases. Intuitively, this is 
reasonable due to the fact that the carry trader will make a profit when the exchange rate moves 
in the opposite direction as the UIP condition predicts. During the periods of a positive interest 
rate differential, the exchange rate should increase according to the UIP condition. However, 
as the carry trader dominates the market, the exchange rate will move downwards when the 
strategy becomes profitable. The carry trader will make a profit in two ways. Firstly, as the 
investor borrows money in the low-interest rate country and invests the money in the high-
interest country, the profit will be given by the interest rate differential. The UIP states that this 
profit should be negatively compensated by a movement in the exchange rate. Secondly, as the 
exchange rate moves in opposite direction of what the theory predicts, the investor will, also, 
make a profit from converting the two exchange rates. A market dominated by carry traders 
will, therefore, have a substantial negative impact on the exchange rate, thus causing the 
Swedish krona to appreciate. However, as the interest rate differential decreases, the profit 
generated by the carry trade strategy becomes lower and the exchange rate will depreciate, i.e. 
increase as fundamental traders will enter the market. 
6.4. Time variation in profits 
The periods of carry trade domination are equivalent to the following dates: 
Table 1. Carry trade domination. 
Interval Time 
1 1988 
2 1992 - 1995 
3 2011 
4 2013 
 
According to Briére and Drut (2009), the carry trade investment possibilities are dependent on 
economic conditions, and the investment profit will be substantially lower in periods of a crisis. 
Additionally, according to Spronk et al. (2013), there should be time variations in investment 
profitability. Table 1 gives an overview of when carry traders dominated the market, thus when 
the strategy was profitable. The model does not show any signs that a specific economic 
condition would be more suitable for a carry trade investment, as stated by Briére and Drut 
(2009). The banking crisis in the early 1990s in Sweden caused interest rates to surge. In our 
model, this would be a signal to carry traders to enter the market. However, it does not seem to 
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be the case as the SEK/GBP depreciated (increased) in 1992 which would indicate that investors 
with different expectations than the carry traders would dominate the market at the time. 
Moreover, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 does not seem to have any particular effect on carry 
trade profitability. Initially, interest rates in both countries dropped rapidly in 2008. The 
Swedish interest rate then increased slightly while the UK interest rate remained constant. This 
lead to a positive but small interest rate differential and thus the entrance of carry traders in the 
model, until the Swedish Riksbank decided to decrease the interest rate once again. 
7. Results and Analysis 
7.1. Statistical properties 
To examine whether the model corresponds with empirical results, the thesis will analyse three 
statistical properties: heavy tails, excess volatility and volatility clustering in exchange rate 
returns. These stylized facts are persistent themes in the exchange rate market (Lux and 
Marchesi, 2000; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). For the model to have an empirical relevance, 
the model should be able to replicate these stylized facts. Therefore, the properties generated 
by the model will be compared to the stylized facts seen in the market. Values of the stylized 
facts can be seen in Table 2. It should be noted that this section does not aim to give a detailed 
explanation of the stylized facts, but rather to let the facts serve as a comparison between the 
model and empirical findings. 
 
The returns of the exchange rate will be approximated by taking log-returns. In financial 
analysis, calculating the returns with log-differences between the exchange rate value in time 𝑡 
and the value in the next period, 𝑡 + 1, is a common method (Kanas and Karkalakos, 2017). 
However, it should be said that the log-return-method is not flawless as log-approximation is 
only a valid method when the returns of the exchange rate are small. Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that this assumption holds for exchange rate returns (Kanas and Karkalakos, 2017). 
 
Table 2. Statistical properties of the returns of the exchange rate simulated by the model and the returns of the exchange rate 
given by data. 
Stylized fact Returnssimulation Returnsdata 
Kurtosis 11.4769 13.3424 
Skewness -0.2205 0.1667 
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Excess volatility 12.6838 8.0318 
 
Heavy tails: excess kurtosis and skewness 
According to Huisman, Koedijk, Kool and Palm (2002), the distribution of foreign exchange 
returns tends to be non-normal, instead they have fat tails. To test if the model generates fat-
tailed returns, the kurtosis value is calculated as fat tails can be measured through excess 
kurtosis. A distribution is defined to have excess kurtosis if the kurtosis value is larger than 
three (Spronk et al. 2013). 
 
Kurtosis is a fourth order moment of the probability distribution. It is measured as: 𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 	𝐸(𝑋 − 𝜇)k𝜎k 							(10) 
where 𝜇 is the mean of X, 𝜎 the standard deviation of X and 𝐸(𝑋 − 𝜇) the expected value of 
the quantity function. Following from equation 10, skewness is a third order moment of the 
probability distribution which is calculated as: 𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 	𝐸(𝑋 − 𝜇)m𝜎m 							 11 . 
 
From Table 2 it is presented that the kurtosis for the simulated exchange rate returns is 11.48 
while the returns on the market have a kurtosis of 13.34. In the study by Huisman et al. (2002), 
the authors calculated kurtosis values for returns between several currencies to the UK pound 
between 1979 and 1996. The authors presented statistics that showed that all currency 
distributions for exchange rate returns in relation to the UK pound exhibited fat tails. 
Nevertheless, between the Swedish krona and the UK pound, excess kurtosis was evident 
during the period. As the kurtosis value generated by the model was greater than three, it is 
showed that the simulation can produce fat-tailed returns. This indicates that, in terms of 
replicating heavy tails successfully, the model is empirically relevant, which also is confirmed 
in the study by Huisman et al. (2002). 
 
The model generated a skewness of -0.22 whereas the skewness seen in the market was positive, 
0.17, which can be seen in Table 2. According to Briere and Drut (2009), an exchange rate 
market where carry traders are more dominant should generate a more negative skewness and 
a higher kurtosis. The same reasoning can be seen in Spronk et al. (2013) where a larger weight 
of carry traders in the market leads to a more negatively skewed return distribution. In the model 
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by Spronk et al. (2013), when interest rates are modelled to make it more difficult for carry 
traders to enter the market, the returns become more positively skewed as carry traders cannot 
influence the currency to appreciate (decrease). For the model to generate returns similar to the 
ones seen in the market, the distribution should have been skewed positively (to the right). As 
the model was not able to generate a positive skewness, this indicates that the model gave carry 
traders too much of an impact in the model, leading to a negative skewness which empirical 
findings do not support. 
Excess volatility 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) discuss the fact that the volatility for exchange rates are much 
more volatile than the underlying economic fundamentals. Excess volatility is defined, as in De 
Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Spronk et al. (2013), as the volatility in the exchange rate that is 
not captured in the fundamental exchange rate. In other words, if the fundamental investor is 
assumed to have rational expectations, the volatility in the exchange rate exceeding this is said 
to be excess volatility. Thus, the excess volatility is measured by: 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦@qrstuv@	wt"@ − 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦=xu<ty@u"tz𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦=xu<ty@u"tz . 
Volatility is measured as the variance of the data. The variance, denoted as 𝜎Z, will lead to the 
equation for excess volatility: 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 	𝜎Z@qrstuv@	wt"@ − 𝜎Z=xu<ty@u"tz𝜎Z=xu<ty@u"tz 								(12). 
 
The excess volatility is measured in relation to the volatility in the fundamental exchange rate. 
The excess volatility is displayed in Table 1, showing that the simulated exchange rate has an 
excess volatility of 12.68 and the exchange rate seen in the market has an excess volatility of 
8.03. An excess volatility of 12.68 is considerably smaller than compared to the excess volatility 
generated in the model by Spronk et al. (2013). It is the chartist trader that extrapolates the 
movements created by the carry trader that generates a higher excess volatility. The question 
for empirical relevance, though, is if the model can show excess volatility similar to what is 
seen in the market. As the simulated exchange rate has a volatility of 12.68, it is much closer to 
the excess volatility seen in the market compared to what the model in Spronk et al. (2013) 
generated. 
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Volatility clustering 
The third stylized fact to be analysed is the tendency for changes in exchange rate returns to be 
followed by even larger changes, a phenomenon called volatility clustering (Lux and Marcesi, 
2000). To test if the model can replicate volatility clustering, the autocorrelation function of 
absolute returns is plotted in Figure 3 for the simulated exchange rate and in Figure 4 the 
autocorrelation function of absolute returns for the exchange rate seen in the market. 
 
The autocorrelation function measures the correlation between the absolute return in period t 
and the absolute return in period t+k, where k is the number of lags in the sample (k = [0, 100]). 
This means that the returns in the first lag (when k = 0) will have an autocorrelation of 1, as it 
is fully correlated with itself. As absolute returns are measures of the volatility, the thesis will 
examine if the volatility can show signs of memory over time, where time is represented as the 
number of lags. 
 
Figure 3. Autocorrelation function of absolute returns for the simulated exchange rate. 
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Figure 4. Autocorrelation function of absolute returns for the exchange rate given by data. 
 
The blue lines in the two figures represent the 5% significance levels for the autocorrelations. 
In both figures, the autocorrelation function of absolute returns declines when the number of 
lags increases. It implies that there is a memory in volatility of absolute returns. Additionally, 
it is understood that the volatility is greater at times and lower at other times, implying that the 
simulated exchange rate and the exchange rate in the market are sometimes volatile and 
sometimes calm. A result that is reasonable. The autocorrelation function of absolute returns in 
the model (Figure 3) is fairly close to the one seen in the market (Figure 4). Therefore, it is 
showed that the model can generate returns that show volatility clustering similar to what is 
seen empirically in the market. 
 
7.2. Model discussion 
The model proposed in this paper is inspired by the model used in Spronk et al. (2013). 
However, in this thesis the model is only a simplified version as the chartist trader is excluded. 
The chartist trader expects that the latest trend in the exchange rate will continue, therefore 
extrapolating all the movements in the exchange rate. The model in this paper was not able to 
generate a result where the simulated exchange rate, for a longer time, stayed above the 
fundamental exchange rate. This is due to the fact that when the exchange rate is close to the 
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Au
to
co
rre
lat
ion
0 20 40 60 80 100
Lag
 26 
fundamental exchange rate, there is no profit to be made by the carry trader, thus the 
fundamental trader will be the only trader to dominate the market. The interaction between a 
chartist trader and a carry trader would probably have solved this problem. A chartist trader 
would impact the exchange rate to show more dynamic changes, forcing the exchange rate to 
increase over the fundamental exchange rate (Spronk et al., 2013).  
 
As the model successfully replicated most stylized facts and generated results that are similar 
to what is seen in the exchange rate market, the construction of a heterogeneous agent model 
was, empirically, a correct methodology. The empirical relevance is one of the reasons for 
choosing a heterogeneous agent model when aiming to replicate an exchange rate market (De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). 
7.3. Critique of Spronk et al. (2013) 
In the paper by Spronk et al. (2013), the chartist trader dominates the market, with the 
consequence that the simulated exchange rate hardly moves below the fundamental exchange 
rate. A model that cannot replicate a simulated exchange rate below the fundamental exchange 
rate, is flawed. Additionally, there is a risk that the chartist trader will have too much of an 
impact on the market, minimising the possibility to see the effects of the carry trader. 
 
The paper by Spronk et al. (2013) argues that carry traders mostly trade between high and low-
interest rate countries as described in the first section. When comparing the interest rates 
between the domestic (high) and foreign (low), there is hardly ever a negative interest rate 
differential. However, to evaluate if the UIP holds, different countries with sometimes high and 
sometimes low interest rates must be examined to see how the UIP relation stands in different 
economic environments, like in the case of Sweden and the United Kingdom. If a model only 
consists of a high-interest domestic country and a low-interest foreign country, then carry 
traders will of course have a significant impact on the exchange rate market. The assumption 
that carry traders often appear in these environments seems plausible. Nevertheless, the UIP 
theory does not state that the relationship only holds for countries with a low interest rate 
differential. 
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7.4. Explaining the forward premium puzzle with Carry traders 
To answer the question whether the carry trade strategy can solve the UIP puzzle, the regression 
in the second section will be constructed. Following from Spronk et al. (2013), the ordinary 
least squares regression is formulated as: 𝑠"#ZZ − 𝑠" = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑟"#ZZ< − 𝑟"#ZZ= + 𝜀"#ZZ 
where the change in the exchange rate for 22 periods ahead, 𝑠"#ZZ − 𝑠", is the dependent 
variable, 𝛼 the intercept, 𝛽 the interest rate differential coefficient at time t+22, and e an error 
term. 𝑟"#ZZ<  and 𝑟"#ZZ=  are daily measures of one-month interest rates and the investment horizon 
is set to one day. One month is equal to 22 trading days. This implicates that the interest rate 
differential will determine the exchange rate change for 22 periods ahead. Due to overlapping 
regressions in the time series data, standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation by using the 
Newey-West estimator. The values of the parameters are displayed in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Table 3. Regression for the simulated exchange rate. 
Coefficient Value p-value t-statistics 
a -0.0070 0.7605 -0.3049 
b -1.2273 0.0394* -2.060 
 
Table 4. Regression for the exchange rate given by data. 
Coefficient Value p-value t-statistics 
a -0.0023 0.8419 -0.1995 
b -0.7087 0.0776 -1.765 
 
According to the UIP theory, the intercept value, a, is expected to be zero and the interest rate 
differential, b, should be equal to one. As Table 3 shows, the regression has an intercept value 
which is not statistically different from zero. However, b has a negative coefficient of -1.23 and 
is statistically significant from zero with a confidence level of 95%. This implies that the 
direction of carry trader impact on the market, which is negative, is statistically proven. The 
value is considerably lower than the one found in Spronk et al. (2013), which is -0.40 and also 
lower than the one found in Froot and Thaler (1990), which was -0.88. 
 
In Table 4, the regression estimates are presented for the exchange rate seen in the market. As 
for the intercept value, a, the value is not statistically significant from zero which is in line with 
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the theory. The b-value however, is negative and statistically significant from zero on a 
confidence level of 90%. The measured value is not as low as the one found in Froot and Thaler 
(1990), but more like the one found in Spronk et al. (2013). 
 
The regression shows that the carry trade strategy might be a possible explanation for why the 
UIP relation does not hold. It is shown that if the market consists of traders with expectations 
similar to the carry trade expectation and a positive interest rate differential occurs, the strategy 
will generate a positive profit and in so leading to an appreciation of the currency with the 
higher interest rate. This phenomenon violates the uncovered interest rate parity. An 
explanation for why the beta value for the regression of the simulated exchange rate was lower 
than what other papers found, is because of the opportunities given to carry traders. In models 
such as in Spronk et al. (2013), the carry trader domination is considerably lower, meaning that 
the interest rate differential is not as negatively impactful as in this model. 
 
To explain the UIP puzzle fully, the carry trade explanation is simply not enough. Nevertheless, 
it provides a good indication of the expectations in the market, and should therefore perhaps be 
included in courses in economics at universities. 
8. Conclusion 
To conclude, the thesis shows that the carry trade strategy can be an explanation to the UIP 
puzzle, therefore giving support to the conclusions in Spronk et al. (2013). The exchange rate 
generated by the model corresponds, to a large extent, with empirical results. However, for a 
heterogeneous agent model to generate results similar to empirical patterns, one ought to 
investigate if the chartist trader should be included in the model. The most probable explanation 
for why the UIP does not hold, is the interaction between carry traders and chartists, as proposed 
in Spronk et al. (2013). However, it must also be said that the existence of chartist traders in a 
model minimises the impacts of the carry traders. For future studies on the UIP puzzle with 
heterogeneous agent models, it should be carefully examined whether the chartist trader should 
be included or not in the model. If an important trader is left out, results might still be generating 
a negative beta value, as in this thesis, but run the risk of being empirically irrelevant. A model 
must be calibrated with care so that the impact of carry traders can be seen but not being fully 
dominated by either carry traders nor chartist traders.  
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